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1823 
Article 
Prosser’s The Fall of the Citadel 
Kenneth S. Abraham† 
Historians are fond of saying that “the past is a foreign 
country.”1 By this I take them to mean that, like coming to 
know a foreign country, understanding the past requires trans-
lation and imagination, and that even then our understanding 
always will be incomplete. I face this challenge in discussing 
William L. Prosser’s 1966 article, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer),2 which is justly regarded in this 
Symposium as one of the four most influential articles pub-
lished during the first one hundred years of the Minnesota Law 
Review. The Fall was cited 120 times in the state and federal 
courts in the ten years after it appeared, when products liabil-
ity was in a process of rapid change and the article was an im-
portant resource for the courts.  
The Fall chronicled what has become one of the central fea-
tures of modern tort law: the imposition of “strict” liability on 
manufacturers for injuries caused by defective products. 
Prosser’s title referred to the citadel of privity, the cluster of 
rules precluding liability for certain kinds of wrongs unless the 
victim and injurer were in privity of contract. The notion of 
these rules as a citadel against liability was made famous by 
(then) Judge Benjamin Cardozo’s observation that the “assault 
upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these days apace.”3 
Because the case in which Cardozo made that statement in-
 
 † David and Mary Harrison Distinguished Professor of Law, University 
of Virginia School of Law. Thanks to Leslie Kendrick and G.E. White for com-
ments on a draft of this Article. Copyright © 2016 by Kenneth S. Abraham. 
 1. The origin of this statement seems to be L.P. HARTLEY, THE GO-
BETWEEN 9 (1953); see also DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN 
COUNTRY 191 (1985). 
 2. William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Con-
sumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [hereinafter Prosser, Fall].  
 3. William L. Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to 
the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1099 (1960) [hereinafter Prosser, Assault] 
(quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931)). 
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volved accountants’ liability, not injury caused by a product, 
and because the case held that the accountant was not liable to 
a set of non-clients because of the absence of privity, the quoted 
statement had an ambiguous valence in the products liability 
context. Prosser nonetheless had picked up the notion of the 
privity requirement as a citadel, and he ran with it.  
In The Fall, Prosser announced the demise of the privity 
rule, against which he had campaigned in successive editions of 
his famous treatise and in an article published in the Yale Law 
Journal in 1960;4 catalogued the manner in which the courts 
were now implementing the new rule; and trumpeted a draft of 
the American Law Institute’s Restatement (Second) of Torts 
§ 402A, articulating the new rule. 
The Fall was all the more significant because of the posi-
tion its author occupied in American law at the time. Prosser 
was the author of the leading twentieth-century treatise on tort 
law, often referred to simply as “Prosser on Torts.”5 By 1966 the 
treatise was in its third edition. Prosser had previously served 
as Dean of the School of Law at the University of California, 
Berkeley for thirteen years, and he was the sole Reporter for 
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. He was, in short, the fore-
most torts authority of his time. Interestingly, The Fall was not 
only a piece of scholarship, but was also something of a home-
town victory lap for its author, who had first practiced law in 
Minneapolis and then begun his academic career at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota Law School thirty-seven years earlier.6 
For all these reasons, it is worth trying to understand how 
Prosser conceived of and reported on the rise of strict products 
liability, both in The Fall and in his work leading up to that ar-
ticle. The challenge of understanding the historical context in 
which The Fall was situated, however, is heightened by the fact 
that, in that article and in work that preceded it, Prosser failed 
almost completely to anticipate important developments that 
would follow very soon thereafter. He showed virtually no in-
terest in the significance of the differences between what we 
now call manufacturing, design, and warning defects, or in the 
 
 4. Id. As Catherine Sharkey shows in her article in this Symposium, the 
privity rule fell in claims for physical injury or damage, but not in claims for 
economic loss. Catherine M. Sharkey, The Remains of the Citadel (Economic 
Loss Rule in Products Cases), 100 MINN. L. REV. 1845, 1847 (2016). 
 5. Kenneth S. Abraham & G. Edward White, Prosser and His Influence, 
6 J. TORT L. 27, 28 (2013). 
 6. Id. at 31. 
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difficulty of defining a defect in design. Yet those differences, 
and that difficulty, have turned out to be central to the law of 
products liability after The Fall. Consequently, the question is 
not only how to understand the past as it is embodied in The 
Fall, but also what to make of the article’s own relation to the 
future of its subject. The relation of this particular past to its 
immediate future is the foreign country that we must visit. 
As I will indicate at more length below, I think that three 
factors explain why Prosser did not focus on what turned out to 
be the future of products liability. First, throughout his career, 
Prosser was a no-duty skeptic. He attacked a whole series of 
such no-duty limitations on the scope of tort liability. He was at 
least as interested in eliminating these limitations as in the 
precise scope of the liability that would grow up thereafter. The 
privity rule was a no-duty barrier to liability. For Prosser, the 
privity rule was the target; strict liability was the result. The 
precise scope of strict products liability was therefore secondary 
to him. Second, most of the appellate cases on products liability 
that Prosser read and cited involved what we now call manu-
facturing defects. These cases gave him little reason to antici-
pate the challenge of defining a design defect that arose later. 
Third, in considering manufacturers’ liability, Prosser may 
have been thinking mainly of “shoddy” products such as adul-
terated food or poorly made durable goods whose defectiveness 
was obvious to him. In this context there would have been no 
need to attend to possible differences in the causes or nature of 
this shoddiness.  
In short, Prosser had been fighting mainly to remedy the 
past failings of products liability law by bringing down the cit-
adel of privity, rather than to erect a fully-designed replace-
ment. Because he was recounting the results of that effort in 
the The Fall, we should understand the article in that context. 
In the following pages I attempt to do that. 
I.  PRODUCTS LIABILITY BEFORE THE FALL   
To understand the fall, we must understand exactly what 
was still standing before the fall. 
And it turns out that the citadel whose fall Prosser an-
nounced had already been partly, arguably even substantially, 
dismantled. Indeed, what fell in the end was the last (though 
important) piece of an only partly-standing edifice.  
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A. FROM WINTERBOTTOM TO MACPHERSON: THE RISE AND FALL  
OF THE CITADEL IN NEGLIGENCE 
The appropriate starting point for understanding the na-
ture and history of the citadel is the English case of 
Winterbottom v. Wright.7 It was in Winterbottom that the cita-
del of privity was erected, or at least first recognized. The 
plaintiff in Winterbottom was an employee of a party who had 
contracted with the Postmaster General to operate 
mailcoaches. The Postmaster General had contracted with a 
third party to supply the coaches and to keep them in a safe 
condition. The employee of the third party was injured by an 
allegedly unsafe feature of one of the coaches. He sued the sup-
plier of the coach for his injuries. The court held that the plain-
tiff-employee had no cause of action for these injuries against 
the supplier of the coach because he had no contract with the 
supplier.  
Winterbottom was soon taken to have held that a plaintiff 
could not recover in tort for product-related injuries unless he 
was in privity of contract with the defendant. Tort actions for 
negligence in making or supplying products that resulted in 
bodily injury were therefore precluded, in the absence of privity 
between the maker or supplier and the injured party.8 
The trajectory of the law on this issue over the next seven-
ty years followed a familiar pattern. First the courts created a 
narrow set of exceptions to the privity rule, for negligence ac-
tions involving products that were “inherently dangerous,” such 
as poison.9 Then the courts expanded the products that fell into 
this category, to include such seemingly ordinary products as a 
scaffold10 and a coffee urn.11 Analyses of these developments 
usually focus on the law of New York,12 because they culminat-
ed in the celebrated opinion in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.13 
 
 7. (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402; 10 M. & W. 109. 
 8. Over the decades there has been some question whether the plaintiff 
was suing in contract or in tort, exactly what the basis of the court’s opinion 
was, and whether the opinion ruled out recovery as broadly as it appeared to 
do. For discussion, see Vernon Palmer, Why Privity Entered Tort—An Histori-
cal Reexamination of Winterbottom v. Wright, 27 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 85, 92–
98 (1983).  
 9. See Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 397, 409–11 (1852). 
 10. Devlin v. Smith, 89 N.Y. 470 (1882). 
 11. Statler v. George A. Ray Mfg. Co., 88 N.E. 1063 (N.Y. 1909). 
 12. See, e.g., EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 
11–17 (1949). 
 13. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916). 
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The plaintiff in MacPherson was injured when a wooden wheel 
on his car shattered. He sued Buick for negligence. Writing for 
the court, Judge Cardozo held that the plaintiff could recover 
from Buick notwithstanding the absence of privity, because a 
car was inherently dangerous if negligently made.14 Dismissing 
the argument that Winterbottom dictated the result, he de-
ployed the memorable conclusion that “[p]recedents drawn 
from the days of travel by stagecoach do not fit the conditions of 
travel to-day.”15  
Exactly what that principle of MacPherson was, however, 
could be discerned only with hindsight. On one level the opin-
ion in MacPherson read as if it was merely developing an even 
broader category of exceptions to the privity rule for things that 
were “inherently dangerous” than had prevailed up to that 
point. The possibility that the privity rule had not been abol-
ished, but merely further eroded, was not merely a theoretical 
point; in the years to come sometimes it still had liability-
limiting consequences.16 Whether, technically speaking, Mac-
Pherson overruled Winterbottom or only created a broader ex-
ception that eventually swallowed up the Winterbottom rule, 
within decades scholars took the former view, and we certainly 
now understand MacPherson to have abolished the privity rule. 
 
 14. Id. at 1053. After reviewing the record in MacPherson almost twenty 
years ago, James Henderson concluded that the facts actually were more com-
plicated than Cardozo had made them seem. The wheel might already have 
been weakened because the car in question had been carrying tombstones over 
rough country roads for a number of months before the accident, the accident 
probably could not have occurred in the manner that was alleged, and the de-
fendant’s negligence was not as clear as the opinion makes it appear. See 
James A. Henderson, Jr., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company: Simplifying 
the Fact While Reshaping the Law, in TORTS STORIES 41, 42–46 (Robert L. 
Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds., 2003). But these differences between 
what may have been the actual facts, and the facts that Cardozo reports, go to 
whether Buick was negligent, not to whether Buick could be held liable even 
in the absence of privity if Buick were negligent. Both Buick and Cardozo ap-
pear to have been more interested in the principle at issue than in the facts of 
this particular case. 
 15. MacPherson, 111 N.E. at 1053. 
 16. As late as 1934, for example, even in New York liability was barred for 
injuries suffered when a defective door handle on a car allowed the door to 
open and the plaintiff to fall out of the car, on the ground that a defective door 
handle was not inherently dangerous. Cohen v. Brockway Motor Truck Corp., 
240 A.D. 18, 19 (N.Y. App. Div. 1934). On the other hand, by 1949 Edward Le-
vi could write that “the exception in favor of liability for negligence where the 
instrument is probably dangerous has swallowed up the purported rule that ‘a 
manufacturer or supplier is never liable for negligence to a remote vendee.’” 
LEVI, supra note 12, at 17. 
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As early as 1941, Prosser had written that the “reasoning 
and . . . fundamental philosophy” of MacPherson rested on the 
“foreseeability of harm if proper care were not used” and that 
although “[m]ost courts have continued to speak the language 
of ‘inherent danger,’ . . . it seems clear that this has meant no 
more than that substantial harm is to be foreseen if the chattel 
should be defective.”17 The point here is that it took some time 
before it was recognized that in MacPherson the citadel of priv-
ity in negligence cases had actually fallen, rather than merely 
having been somewhat further dismantled. And Prosser, as he 
often did, was not only observing but also predicting the direc-
tion he both hoped and expected the law to develop, but doing 
so in the language of observation.18 By 1960, he was able to re-
port that the rule was now “a general rule imposing negligence 
liability upon any supplier, for remuneration, of any chattel,” 
with only “New York and three or four other courts” still talk-
ing “the language of ‘inherent danger.’”19 
B. PARALLEL DEVELOPMENTS IN STRICT LIABILITY 
Prosser’s account of MacPherson was part of a larger story 
that he had been recounting since the publication of the first 
edition of his treatise in 1941. This other piece of the story in-
volved strict liability. It had three parts. 
First, as Prosser described,20 versions of the Uniform Sales 
Act of 1906, predecessor to the Uniform Commercial Code, were 
enacted in a number of states during the first decades of the 
20th century.21 These Acts provided that an implied warranty 
of merchantability accompanied the sale of goods subject to the 
Act.22 This was mainly a warranty of quality pertaining to the 
economic value of the goods sold. But some courts held that di-
rect sellers were liable to purchasers for bodily injury caused by 
breach of that implied warranty.23 
The innovation here was in the liability standard that im-
plied warranty entailed. The implied warranty of merchantabil-
 
 17. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 677–78 (1st 
ed. 1941) [hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK I] (footnotes omitted).  
 18. For an account of the settings in which he did this, see Abraham & 
White, supra note 5, at 46–51. 
 19. Prosser, Assault, supra note 3, at 1102 (footnotes omitted). 
 20. PROSSER, HANDBOOK I, supra note 17, at 670–72. 
 21. CHARLES THADDEUS TERRY, UNIFORM STATE LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 189 (1920). 
 22. Id. at 205.  
 23. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. Mohican Co., 121 N.E. 471, 472–73 (N.Y. 1918). 
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ity was breached, and liability for resulting bodily injury could 
be imposed, regardless of whether the seller had been negligent 
in any way and even if the package was sold without the possi-
bility of inspection. The seller might have received a sealed 
package from the manufacturer and sold the product in that 
package. In effect, liability for breach of the implied warranty 
was strict liability. Because there was privity between seller 
and buyer in this situation, this was of course no exception to 
the privity rule and therefore involved no attack on the citadel. 
Second, however, under the warranty theory a retail seller 
held liable to its buyer might have an action-over for indemnifi-
cation from the wholesaler that had sold it the product, or from 
the manufacturer.24 The practical result was that, indirectly, 
the manufacturer was strictly liable to the buyer. 
Third, the concept of an implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity was a link to the frontal attack on the citadel that would be-
come Prosser’s focus. In cases involving impure food, some 
courts held that an implied warranty of merchantability ran 
from the manufacturer or producer of food to the ultimate con-
sumer.25 This was an enormous conceptual leap, since the no-
tion of warranty was essentially contractual and there was no 
contract between the manufacturer or producer and the ulti-
mate consumer. And the liability accomplished by the leap was 
effectively strict liability.  
The courts that imposed this liability described it in a vari-
ety of ways, at which the Realist in Prosser scoffed.26 He want-
ed warranty liability to be extended beyond food, to all prod-
ucts. In the first edition of Prosser on Torts, in 1941, he argued 
that:  
No reason is apparent for limiting it to food cases, and it may be an-
ticipated that it will extend, first to other products involving a high 
degree of risk, and perhaps eventually to anything which may be ex-
pected to do harm if it is defective. If that is to occur, it seems far bet-
 
 24. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (Cal. 
1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). 
 25. See, e.g., Mazetti v. Armour & Co., 135 P. 633 (Wash. 1913); PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK I, supra note 17, at 690–91. 
 26. PROSSER, HANDBOOK I, supra note 17, at 690–91 (“The various devices 
adopted include a fictitious agency of the intermediate dealer for the consum-
er’s purchase, an imaginary assignment by the dealer of the producer’s war-
ranty of fitness for the purpose, a third party beneficiary contract made with 
the dealer for the benefit of the consumer, a warranty ‘running with the title’ 
as in the case of conveyances of land, and the rather undefined ground that 
the manufacturer has represented the goods to be suitable by placing them on 
the market.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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ter to discard the troublesome sales doctrine of “warranty,” and im-
pose strict liability in tort, as a pure matter of social policy.27 
Thus we see the first published salvo in Prosser’s pro-
longed attack on the citadel.  
The dismantling of the citadel prior to the fall continued 
one step further after that. The implied warranty of merchant-
ability of the manufacturer of food to the ultimate consumer 
had originated at least as early as 1913.28 By the late 1950s it 
had been extended, in some cases in some states, to products 
intended for intimate bodily consumption, such as hair dye29 
and permanent wave solution.30 
In retrospect, intellectually the most important event in 
the period was the appearance of Justice Roger Traynor’s 1944 
concurrence in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno.31 Cit-
ing Prosser five times,32 Traynor argued that there should be 
strict liability for injuries caused by all defective products, not 
only food, and that the whole warranty apparatus should be 
discarded in favor of more straightforward strict liability (he 
called it “absolute” liability) in tort. But Traynor’s opinion was 
not influential at the time and gained attention only later.33 
So the citadel was hardly a fully erect edifice by the end of 
the 1950s. Without question, however, there was one very im-
portant part of it still standing: manufacturers of durable 
goods—products other than food, drink, drugs, or material ap-
plied to the body—were liable to third parties only in negli-
gence. That restriction on products liability was the “citadel” 
about which Prosser wrote.  
C. PROSSER’S ASSAULT 
That is where products liability law stood when Prosser 
published The Assault on the Citadel in 1960.34 In the first 
quarter of the article he reported the developments I have just 
 
 27. Id. at 692.  
 28. See Mazetti, 135 P. at 634. 
 29. Graham v. Bottenfield’s, Inc., 269 P.2d 413, 418 (Kan. 1954). 
 30. Markovich v. McKesson & Robbins, Inc., 149 N.E.2d 181 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1958). 
 31. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (Cal. 
1944). 
 32. Id. at 441–43. 
 33. George L. Priest, The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical His-
tory of the Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 
461, 498–99 (1985). 
 34. Prosser, Assault, supra note 3. 
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recounted, though in greater detail, and then moved to a sec-
tion he called “Beyond Food.”35 Here he reported “seven spec-
tacular decisions, which appear to have thrown the limitation 
to food onto the ash pile, and to hold that the seller of any 
product who sells it in a condition dangerous for use is strictly 
liable . . . for injuries resulting from such use.”36  
This was exaggeration, to say the least. One of the cases 
(from California), as Prosser admitted, had promptly been va-
cated after it was decided.37 Another, he also admitted, was de-
cided by a New York court applying California law, in which 
the court apparently was unaware that the California case on 
which it relied had been vacated.38 Only one of the five remain-
ing cases involved bodily injury.39 Although the theory behind 
the four cases involving property damage was the same as the 
theory that would have applied to bodily injury, none of the five 
decisions seemed to have recognized that they were adopting a 
radically new rule. This was not a set of “spectacular” decisions, 
not the “Trend” Prosser claimed, and the cases did not “give the 
definite impression that the dam has busted, and [that] those 
in the path of the avalanche would do well to make for the 
hills.”40 Rather, there was a trickle of cases moving in the direc-
tion Prosser was pointing. If a contemporary law student had 
made Prosser’s claims solely on the basis of the cases in ques-
tion, his or her competence to practice law at all might well 
have been called into question.  
Nonetheless, based on the “Trend,” Prosser said that “it 
needs no prophet to forsee [sic] that there will be other such de-
cisions in the next few years, and that the storming of the inner 
citadel is already in full cry.”41 Actually, it did need a prophet, 
 
 35. Id. at 1110. 
 36. Id. at 1112. 
 37. Peterson v. Lamb Rubber Co., 343 P.2d 261 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959), va-
cated, 353 P.2d 575 (Cal. 1960); Prosser, Assault, supra note 3, at 1113 n.113. 
 38. Hinton v. Republic Aviation Corp., 180 F. Supp. 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); 
Prosser, Assault, supra note 3, at 1113 n.115. 
 39. B. F. Goodrich v. Hammond, 269 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1959); Prosser, 
Assault, supra note 3, at 1112 n.109. 
 40. Prosser, Assault, supra note 3, at 1113. 
 41. Id. at 1113–14. As George Priest has noted, at other points in Assault 
Prosser seems to suggest that he did not think that strict liability would be 
quickly adopted. See Priest, supra note 33, at 507. For example, Prosser says 
that “[w]hen we come to other products, not intended for such bodily use, one 
may speculate that, notwithstanding the spectacular eruption of recent deci-
sions, expansion of the strict liability of the seller is likely to proceed more 
slowly.” Prosser, Assault, supra note 3, at 1139 (footnotes omitted). Although 
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and Prosser was both a prophet and more. As he had been in 
the past in predicting other changes in tort law, Prosser was 
extremely adept at prophesying legal change, even if he was 
apt to exaggerate the support he had for his predictions.42 In 
addition, however, Prosser could actually affect the accuracy of 
his predictions, because he was so influential. And that is ex-
actly what he did.  
II.  THE FALL, THE RESTATEMENT, AND THE FALL   
In the six years following publication of The Assault, there 
were major developments. First, the last part of the citadel did 
actually fall; next, Prosser captured the new regime in a draft 
of the Restatement (Second); and then he chronicled both de-
velopments in The Fall. 
A. THE FALL AND THE RESTATEMENT 
At virtually the same moment that The Assault appeared 
in print, the first of two decisions that Prosser regarded as con-
stituting the fall of the citadel was published. First, in 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,43 the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey held in 1960 that an auto manufacturer could be held 
liable for bodily injury to the wife of an ultimate purchaser of 
the vehicle, for breach of the manufacturer’s implied warranty 
of merchantability, and that the manufacturer’s attempted dis-
claimer of such liability in the contract of sale between the 
dealer and the purchaser was invalid. 
In contrast to the seven decisions that Prosser had charac-
terized as a “trend” in The Assault, Henningsen combined all 
the elements necessary to constitute a clear “fall.” The plaintiff 
had suffered bodily injury, not economic loss or property dam-
age only; the court clearly recognized the significance of its 
holding, engaging in extended analysis of the justifications for 
imposing such liability, and rejecting the arguments against 
doing so.44 In addition, the court made clear not only that the 
implied warranty of merchantability required no privity, but 
 
this statement is not technically inconsistent with the other passages I have 
quoted in the text, at the least the tone and import of these passages, all in the 
same article, are certainly very different. 
 42. See Abraham & White, supra note 5, at 52–53, 59–60 (discussing 
Prosser’s earlier predictions regarding the torts of intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and invasion of privacy). 
 43. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960). 
 44. Id. 
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also that such a warranty could not be disclaimed so as to pre-
clude liability for bodily injury.45 Henningsen effectively im-
posed strict liability in tort, although the court did not describe 
it that way. 
Then, in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,46 the Su-
preme Court of California held in 1963 that a manufacturer 
could be held strictly liable in tort for bodily injury caused by a 
defect in a product, regardless of any of the “intricacies” of war-
ranty law (what the court called “the law of sales”). Citing 
Prosser’s Assault three times,47 the opinion was written by 
(now) Chief Justice Roger Traynor, who had written the con-
currence in Escola proposing strict liability in tort, nineteen 
years earlier.48 His concurrence had become the unanimous 
opinion of the court. At least in New Jersey and California, 
then, without question the entire citadel had finally fallen.  
During these years, as the sole Reporter for the Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts, Prosser prepared successive drafts that 
attempted to capture the developing law on the subject. Finally, 
his 1965 draft of § 402A of the Restatement provided that there 
was strict liability for injury caused by a product in a “defective 
condition, unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.”49 
As was sometimes his tendency, the case law he cited in sup-
port of this section was more ambiguous than he acknowl-
edged,50 though it is quite possible that § 402A would have been 
adopted by the American Law Institute even if Prosser’s cita-
tions had erred by being too conservative. In any event, the fall 
of the citadel had begun, and it would be consummated across 
the country over the next decade. 
B. THE FALL 
And that brings us to the The Fall. In addition to 
Henningsen, Greenman, and the Restatement, The Fall was in-
fluential in persuading other courts to bring down the citadel. 
 
 45. Id. at 95, 99–100. 
 46. 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963). 
 47. Id. at 900–01. 
 48. Not entirely coincidentally, Traynor had recommended that Prosser be 
Dean of Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, 
and Prosser took the post in 1948. Abraham & White, supra note 5, at 35. 
Traynor’s son, Michael Traynor, has told me that while they were growing up, 
he and his siblings were “in and out of the Prosser home all the time.” 
 49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST., Tentative 
Draft, 1965). 
 50. Priest, supra note 33, at 511–18. 
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In the ten years between the time the article was published and 
1975, The Fall was cited ninety-five times in state courts and 
twenty-five times in federal courts.51  
The article spans fifty-seven pages. The first fourteen are 
an account of the fall itself, with a focus on Henningsen.52 The 
remaining forty-one pages address a long list of issues that the 
cases thus far had not addressed, and that subsequent cases 
would have to address: What Products?, What Defendants?, 
What Plaintiffs?, What Damages?, Abnormal Use, Intervening 
Conduct, Notice to the Seller, Disclaimers, Express Representa-
tions, Contributory Fault, and Proof.53  
The one issue that is not discussed, however, is What De-
fects? And yet that is the issue that has dominated strict prod-
ucts liability in the years since it was adopted and The Fall was 
published. In the decades after the fall of the citadel, products 
liability defects turned out to fall into three different catego-
ries: manufacturing, design, and warning defects.54 Perhaps the 
principal challenge has been how to define a design defect in a 
way that results in strict liability for a “defective” design, ra-
ther than simply for a design itself. The modern risk-utility test 
that has emerged seems much more like a negligence than a 
 
 51. Cases Citing William L. Prosser’s The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Lia-
bility to the Consumer) from 1966–1975, HEINONLINE, http://home.heinonline 
.org (enter “The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer)” into the 
search bar and click on “Cited by 207 Cases” link next to the article title to see 
the cases citing this article).  
 52. Henningsen was undoubtedly the right case to cite as marking the fi-
nal fall of the citadel. It was decided in 1960. In 1964, however, a year before 
The Fall appeared, in the third edition of Prosser’s treatise, Henningsen and 
Greenman were relegated to a footnote, and it was Spence v. Three Rivers 
Builders and Masonry Supply, one of the seven “spectacular” cases he had cit-
ed in The Assault, that was mentioned in the text. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 677 (3d ed. 1964) [hereinafter PROSSER, 
HANDBOOK III]. By the time The Fall was published, however, it was Spence 
that was relegated to a footnote. Prosser, Fall, supra note 2, at 792 n.4. I think 
the explanation for this radical change of emphasis is probably that, at the 
time he revised the treatise, Prosser had other priorities, including being Re-
porter for the Restatement, and simply did not make the effort to revise the 
third edition of the treatise to conform to what he knew was the significance of 
Henningsen and Greenman. Two years later, in The Fall, he made that effort. 
See generally Abraham & White, supra note 5 (describing the frequently min-
imal revisions that Prosser made in successive editions of his treatise). 
 53. Prosser, Fall, supra note 2, at 805–40.  
 54. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, THE FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF TORT LAW 
227–35 (4th ed. 2012). 
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strict liability test.55 But at the time of the fall the potential 
importance of the differences among these categories was not 
recognized. The third edition of Prosser’s treatise (1964) con-
tained a single sentence about negligent design, two sentences 
about negligent warning, and a half-sentence about strict liabil-
ity for defective design.56 
Prosser had written about unsafe products as early as the 
first edition of his treatise, published in 1941.57 He was general-
ly fond of employing graphic factual examples to illustrate the 
points he made in the treatise. But in the 1941 edition the text 
of his material on liability for defective products (he called 
them “chattels” until the fourth edition in 1971) was curiously 
abstract. There were no textual examples illustrating what it 
meant for a manufacturer to be negligent, for the immediate 
seller of a product to breach its implied warranty of merchant-
ability, or for the indirect seller of food to breach the same war-
ranty. It was necessary to consult the cases in which these 
products figured to identify what made then unmerchantable. 
By the second edition (1955), there were a few textual examples 
of products other than food for which the cases had imposed li-
ability for breach of implied warranty in the absence of privity. 
This revealed that the cases involved contaminated dog food, 
wire embedded in a bar of soap, a grinding wheel that disinte-
grated during ordinary usage, and a dangerous crop-dusting 
compound likely to drift.58  
Even in the third edition of the treatise, published after the 
actual fall of the citadel but two years before The Fall, there 
are only a few additional examples, and with the exception of 
the case that Prosser identifies as bringing down the citadel by 
imposing liability for injury caused by defective cinder building 
blocks,59 the text identifies the products involved in the cases 
 
 55. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 2 (AM. 
LAW INST. 1997) (defining a design defect in risk-utility terms). 
 56. PROSSER, HANDBOOK III, supra note 52, at 665. The half-sentence re-
garding strict liability contains a footnote citing Blitzstein v. Ford Motor Co., 
288 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1961), but that case itself is really about a manufactur-
ing defect. It involved an explosion of a new vehicle purchased two days earli-
er, resulting from the combination of a manufacturing defect and a design that 
made the vehicle vulnerable to explosion if there was a manufacturing defect. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK III, supra note 52, at 665 n.77. 
 57. PROSSER, HANDBOOK I, supra note 17.  
 58. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 510 (2d ed. 
1955) [hereinafter PROSSER, HANDBOOK II]. 
 59. Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 90 N.W.2d 
873 (Mich. 1958); PROSSER, HANDBOOK III, supra note 52.  
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that imposed strict liability, not what made these products un-
safe.60 The point in all three editions is to indicate what prod-
ucts are subject to liability, not what about the products gener-
ates liability when there is liability. Nor was this due to the 
limitations of a treatise. Prosser’s discussion in Assault of the 
seven cases that he identifies as showing that “the dam has 
busted”61 names the products but not the alleged defects in 
them. 
In failing even to note what made those products unsafe, 
Prosser was implying either that this was unimportant or that 
it went without saying. Since we can discount the former, the 
latter seems more likely to have been the case. Why would he 
have failed to recognize or discuss what has become so central 
an issue in the body of law whose creation he helped to make 
possible? I believe there are three reasons. 
1. A Predominant Concern with No-Duty Limitations on  
Liability 
Prosser was concerned for decades with eliminating what 
he considered unjustified, formalistic common law limitations 
on the imposition of tort liability. For Prosser, the citadel of 
privity was not an isolated restriction on the scope of liability 
for one type of injury. Rather, it was one of a whole series of no-
duty or limited-duty rules with which Prosser and many of his 
contemporaries were extremely impatient. 
From the beginning, Prosser’s treatise was strewn with ex-
amples of this impatience, and with accompanying criticism of 
a series of formalistic common law no-duty restrictions on lia-
bility. Criticizing the courts’ reluctance to recognize liability for 
intentional infliction of emotional distress, he said that “[i]t is 
the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even 
at the expense of a ‘flood of litigation,’ and it is a pitiful confes-
sion of incompetence on the part of any court of justice to deny 
relief on such grounds.”62 Speaking of the rule that there is no 
duty to avoid injuring an unborn child, he said that “[a]ll writ-
ers who have discussed the problem have joined in condemning 
 
 60. PROSSER, HANDBOOK III, supra note 52, at 677–78 (identifying, in ad-
dition to the products identified in the second edition, PROSSER, HANDBOOK II, 
supra note 58, automobiles, airplanes, an electric cable, other grinding wheels, 
a combination power tool, playground equipment, herbicides, insecticides, a 
chair, a riveting machine, and a water heater). 
 61. Prosser, Assault, supra note 3, at 1111–13. 
 62. PROSSER, HANDBOOK I, supra note 17, at 56 (footnote omitted). 
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the existing rule.”63 Regarding the cases holding that there is 
no affirmative duty to rescue, he said that “[s]uch decisions are 
revolting to any moral sense.”64 As to the objections to recovery 
for negligently causing mental distress, he said that “[a]ll these 
objections have been demolished many times, and it is thresh-
ing old straw to deal with them.”65 Indeed, he is famous for say-
ing more generally that “duty is not sacrosanct in itself, but on-
ly an expression of the sum total of those considerations of 
policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is 
entitled to protection.”66 
It was this same attitude toward restrictions of liability 
based on the absence of duty, I think, that made Prosser dis-
miss the privity rule and its roots in contract. From 1941 on he 
repeatedly argued to the effect that, since warranty 
was originally a tort action, . . . [a] return to tort theory is still possi-
ble, if the courts choose to find that the manufacturer has assumed a 
duty toward those who use his product. . . . By whatever name, the 
result is that the producer is made to guarantee the fitness of the 
product.67  
Thus, I believe that Prosser’s motivation and understand-
ing of what happened when the citadel fell were of a piece with 
what he had been saying, over an entire career, of no-duty limi-
tations on liability generally. One of his goals was to help bring 
down the citadel of privity, as well as eliminate the other, arbi-
trary and formalistic limitations on liability. After that, the 
courts would be liberated to address the proper scope of liabil-
ity on the merits. And exactly what those merits consisted of 
was sometimes important to Prosser, but not always. His con-
cern was not whether or under what circumstances there would 
be liability for design defects, but that the courts be permitted 
to decide this question without the artificial restrictions im-
posed on them by the citadel of privity. It was ensuring the fall 
of that citadel, and not what edifice would be erected in its 
place, with which Prosser was predominantly concerned. 
2. A Limited Body of Design Defect Cases 
A close examination of the cases Prosser cited in The Fall 
helps to explain his inattention to what it meant for a product 
 
 63. Id. at 190. 
 64. Id. at 193. 
 65. Id. at 211. 
 66. Id. at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 67. Id. at 690–91 (footnotes omitted). 
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to be defective. There had been few appellate opinions directly 
addressing the issue, and most allegations pertained to what 
we would now call manufacturing defects. By my count (there 
is some judgment involved) there are 163 different cases cited 
in what I would call the weight-bearing footnotes of The 
Fallthose that address in some way the basis for imposing li-
ability and in which it is possible to identify the basis for the 
allegation of defectiveness.68 Of these, 121 cases involved what 
we would now call a manufacturing defect. An additional hand-
ful involve allegations of the failure to warn.  
Of the forty-two cases that can be characterized as contain-
ing what we would now call a design defect allegation, one sub-
group involved such products as cigarettes or drugs, for which 
(judging from Restatement § 402A) Prosser thought that, at 
most, only a warning would normally be required. He would not 
have found it necessary to consider what might have constitut-
ed a design defect in these products, because he would not have 
thought them defective.69  
Another sub-group alleged a design defect but the issue on 
appeal was something else, such as whether the privity rule 
applied at all. A final sub-group involved durable products, but 
never seemed to have confronted the nature of a design defect 
directly. This was often, though not always, because the defect 
in design was pretty obvious: for example, an under-the-chair 
mechanism that severed the plaintiff’s finger when he simply 
rested his hand underneath a rocking chair and rocked on it,70 
and a valve on a welding unit that permitted the release of ex-
plosive gas.71 
Based on those casesthe cases that Prosser was reading 
and citingI believe that he simply did not think that design 
defect litigation would become a major phenomenon after the 
 
 68. These are footnotes 4, 10–27, 34–39, 49–59, 61–63, 69, 75, 80, 84–89, 
95–103, 105–08, and 110–19.  
 69. Comment i to § 402A reflected his position on this issue: 
Good whiskey is not unreasonably dangerous merely because it will 
make some people drunk . . . . Good tobacco is not unreasonably dan-
gers merely because the effects of smoking may be harmful . . . . Good 
butter is not unreasonably dangerous merely because, if such be the 
case, it deposits cholesterol in the arteries and leads to heart attacks 
. . . .  
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. i (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
 70. Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d. 299 (Fla. 1956); Prosser, Fall, 
supra note 2, at 794 n.14. 
 71. Hill v. Harbor Steel & Supply Co., 132 N.W.2d 54 (Mich. 1965); 
Prosser, Fall, supra note 2, at 795 n.18.  
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fall of the citadel, or that defining what we would now call a de-
sign defect would create any more difficulty than defining what 
we would now call a manufacturing defect.  
Nor was Prosser alone in his lack of attention to the nature 
of the defects that would be the subject of liability after the fall. 
At around the same time there were a number of other articles 
addressing products liability. Two of the most prominent were 
by Dean Page Keeton and Chief Justice Roger Traynor. Both 
articles reveal the same, nearly-complete absence of a sharp fo-
cus on the nature and contours of the “defectiveness” for which 
strict liability was now going to be imposed. Keeton distin-
guished products in which “[t]here was something deleterious,” 
the “presence of which was unknown to the manufacturer,” 
from those in which the product “is exactly as it was intended 
to be and as other products of like kind were, as is generally 
true . . . of drugs, cosmetics, and tobacco.”72 Keeton was obvi-
ously groping toward the later distinction between manufactur-
ing and design defects, but his analysis revealed the same un-
reflective attitude toward the question of what made a product 
defective as Prosser’s.73 
Traynor’s article revealed a somewhat greater appreciation 
of the issue, but did not make much headway with it. He noted 
that “the manufacturer’s strict liability depends on what is 
meant by defective.”74 He then went on to say that no single 
definition would resolve all cases, but that a defective product 
may be defined as: 
[O]ne that fails to match the average quality of like products . . . . 
Thus, the lathe in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc. was defec-
tive because it was not built with a proper fastening device as other 
lathes are. The automobile in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co. was de-
fective because the brakes went on unexpectedly, as normal brakes do 
not. Although many questions still attend the problem of harm 
caused by smoking itself, courts have found the manufacturer liable 
for injury from a foreign object in tobacco. If a normal sample of de-
fendant’s product would not have injured plaintiff, but the peculiari-
 
 72. Page Keeton, Products Liability—Liability Without Fault and the Re-
quirement of a Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 859 (1963). 
 73. In fact, the remainder of the article was divided into the following cat-
egories: “Foreign Substance in Product,” “Food,” “Allergies,” and “Cigarettes,” 
the kinds of products whose defects were obvious when they were defective. Id. 
at 857–59. 
 74. Roger J. Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and 
Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV. 363, 366 (1965). 
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ties of the particular product did cause harm, the manufacturer is li-
able for injuries caused by this deviation.75 
In this passage, Traynor strayed back and forth between 
examples of what we now call manufacturing (defective brakes, 
a foreign object in a cigarette) and design defects (a lathe with 
an improper fastening device). The lathe example is taken di-
rectly from Greenman. But it is worth noting that the opinion 
even in that case does not clearly reveal that the lathe had a 
design defect. In his article, Traynor’s “deviation from the 
norm” conception appears to have comprehended both types of 
defects. And his subsequent discussion strayed off into una-
voidably dangerous products, mostly drugs, as to which only a 
warning would be required. The one exception was his example 
of a case he considered difficult and had no ready way of resolv-
ing—an automobile part that normally lasts five years, but “the 
one in question proves defective after six months.”76  
To sum up, neither Prosser nor his peers seemed to con-
template the difficulty of defining a defect, in part because 
what is problematic about this notion tends to arise in design 
defect cases, and there were few of those.  
3. A Focus on “Shoddy” Products 
A third reason Prosser did not attend in The Fall to the na-
ture of product defects is a bit more speculative, since we are 
dealing very much here with the “foreign country” to which I 
referred at the outset. He may have thought that the products 
that would result in liability for injuries they caused would be 
obviously unsafe, or of obviously low quality. He may have 
thought, that is, that what made a product defective went al-
most without saying. There are only a few sentences expressly 
about the issue in all of § 402A, for example, and they are con-
sistent with this interpretation: 
The defective condition may arise not only from harmful ingredients, 
not characteristic of the product itself either as to presence or quanti-
ty, but also from foreign objects contained in the product, from decay 
or deterioration before sale, or from the way the product is prepared 
or packed.77 
Although we cannot precisely reconstruct what Prosser ac-
tually had in mind, it is consistent with Prosser’s reasoning and 
arguments over the years that he was operating under the as-
 
 75. Id. at 367 (footnotes omitted). 
 76. Id. at 369. 
 77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 
1965). 
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sumption that the core problem that needed to be addressed 
was the “shoddy” product. The notion of shoddiness transcends 
the distinction we draw today between manufacturing defects 
and design defects. Indeed, when the focus is on the quality and 
safety of the individual item in the consumer’s hands, and not 
the manufacturer’s conduct or the cause of the shoddiness, this 
distinction is irrelevant.  
Prosser was born in 1899. He came of age immediately af-
ter the muckraking journalists of the progressive era had ex-
posed (among other things) the filthy conditions and low quali-
ty of the food being manufactured at the time. In Assault, 
Prosser had quoted at length from a piece of journalism pub-
lished fifty-five years earlier, demonstrating that a “major part 
of the food” that the public consumed was “adulterated and 
preserved with poisonous chemicals.”78 He indicated that Upton 
Sinclair’s 1906 novel about the conditions in the meatpacking 
industry, The Jungle, was in his view a “bad piece of litera-
ture,” but he acknowledged that these conditions “were in all 
conscience bad enough.”79  
In addition, this was an era during which there was in-
crease in the availability of consumer products, and therefore of 
the possibility of being injured by them if they were of poor 
quality. To give just one example, the electrification of homes in 
the United States meant that electronic irons, sewing ma-
chines, vacuum cleaners, and other electric products became 
much more available. In 1907, only 8% of U.S. residences had 
electricity. By 1925, when Prosser was thirty-three years old, 
the figure had risen to 53.2%.80 In subsequent years there was 
concernhow widespread is unclearthat the quality of such 
products was unsatisfactory.81 It seems quite likely that Prosser 
and others of his generation were familiar with these concerns.  
Therefore, it is quite possible that Prosser (and his col-
leagues) still had in mind the paradigm of the shoddy product 
that was the exemplar of a defect when they had first begun to 
think about product quality and product liability law. By the 
 
 78. Prosser, Assault, supra note 3, at 1105 & n.39. 
 79. Id. at 1105. 
 80. ROBERT N. MAYER, THE CONSUMER MOVEMENT: GUARDIANS OF THE 
MARKETPLACE 19 (1989). 
 81. See, e.g., STUART CHASE & F.J. SCHLINK, YOUR MONEY’S WORTH 77–
86 (1927) (recounting studies showing that only four of twenty-three repre-
sentative carburetors showed good all-round performance, and that of sixteen 
small motors used on such appliances as washing machines and vacuum 
cleaners, twelve failed to comply with trade association standards). 
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time the citadel fell, other forces (market concerns about safety, 
and the beginnings of administrative safety regulation, for ex-
ample) had substantially reduced the problem that Prosser had 
been addressing during his entire career. He was, to some ex-
tent, still fighting the last war, even while the central issue 
would soon become design rather than manufacturing defects. 
For example, Ralph Nader’s book about the design of the Chev-
rolet Corvair, Unsafe at Any Speed, was published in 1965.82 
George Priest, who probably has studied the development 
of § 402A of the Restatement more than any other scholar, has 
concluded that what he calls the “founders” of § 402A intended 
only to eliminate the technical, warranty law defenses that the 
privity rule created, and only to address what we now call 
manufacturing defects.83 
I think the matter is more complicated than that. Professor 
Priest is definitely correct, for the reasons that I described ear-
lier, that Prosser’s focus was mainly on deficiencies that would 
later be called manufacturing defects. But the minor revisions 
that Prosser made in the fourth edition of his treatise (the only 
words he ever published about products liability after writing 
The Fall) tend to show that he did intend § 402A to apply be-
yond manufacturing defects and warnings. The terminology of 
§ 402A may “leave something to be desired,” he said, “since it is 
clear that the ‘defect’ need not be a matter of errors in manu-
facture, and that a product is ‘defective’ when it is properly 
made according to an unreasonably dangerous design.”84 He al-
so said in a footnote85 and in text,86 however, that a manufac-
turer’s liability for a defective design would usually turn on the 
same issues as in negligence. This suggests that he did recog-
 
 82. RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF 
THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE (1965).  
 83. George L. Priest, Strict Products Liability: The Original Intent, 10 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2301, 2303 (1989).  
 84. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 659 (4th ed. 
1971). 
 85. Id. at 659 n.72 (“Since proper design is a matter of reasonable fitness, 
the strict liability adds little or nothing to negligence on the part of the manu-
facturer; but it becomes more important in the case of a dealer who does not 
design the product.”). 
 86. Id. at 644 (“There are, in addition, two particular areas in which 
the liability of the manufacturer, even though it may occasionally be 
called strict, appears to rest primarily upon a departure from proper 
standards of care, so that the tort is essentially a matter of negligence. 
One of these involves the design of the product . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
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nize that the major impact of § 402A would be on liability for 
manufacturing defects.  
In any event, I disagree with Professor Priest’s implication 
that Prosser thought that he was addressing a largely technical 
problem and that the move to strict liability would not be sig-
nificant.87 The Fall, and The Assault five years earlier, are writ-
ten in dramaticarguably overly dramaticlanguage. Prosser 
says in The Fall that “[t]he leaguer [i.e., siege] had been an epic 
one of more than fifty years” and that what followed 
Henningsen “has been the most rapid and altogether spectacu-
lar overturn of an established rule in the entire history of the 
law of torts.”88 Reciting the justifications given for the new rule, 
Prosser says that the “public interest in human safety requires 
the maximum possible protection for the user of the product.”89 
The language in these passages does not constitute a dry report 
by a legal engineer recounting a technical fix. It is the trium-
phant language of a reformer who believes that he has helped 
to change public policy in an important way.  
The upshot is that it would be wrong to conclude that 
Prosser understood the fall to be significant only for manufac-
turing defects. Prosser thought he was doing something im-
portant in helping to bring down the citadel, but he appreciat-
ed, at least a few years later, that the fall would not and did not 
change the essence of what had to be proved in order to recover 
from a manufacturer for injuries caused by a defective product 
design. Prosser thought that the fall did more than make a 
technical change in the law, but I suspect that he still did not 
appreciate how significant, conceptually and quantitatively, de-
sign defect litigation would become. 
  CONCLUSION   
We will never be able to know exactly what Prosser was 
thinking about the future of products liability when he wrote 
The Fall. But based on his lifelong impatience with no-duty 
rules, the case law he cited, and the history of product safety 
and products liability during his lifetime, we have some evi-
dence of his major concerns. He was not focused on the differ-
ence between manufacturing and design defects, and he may 
 
 87. See Priest, supra note 83, at 2309 (“As a consequence, Prosser be-
lieved, a standard of strict liability for product defects would introduce very 
little change in the law.”). 
 88. Prosser, Fall, supra note 2, at 791, 793–94 (footnote omitted). 
 89. Id. at 799. 
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well have had the paradigm of the “shoddy” product in mind 
when he thought about the meaning of defectiveness. This 
would have been a much more backward-looking rather than a 
forward-looking way of thinking about the issue. His major 
concern, as his title makes absolutely clear, was the fall of the 
citadel of privity, not the detailed contours of the strict liability 
that would develop thereafter. The Fall was a chronicle of 
Prosser’s triumph, not an attempt to anticipate the long-term 
results of that triumph.  
